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Abstract
Two studies explored the stability of art preference in patients with Alzheimer’s disease and age-matched control participants. Preferences for three diﬀerent styles of paintings, displayed on art postcards, were examined over two sessions. Preference for speciﬁc paintings diﬀered among individuals but AD and non-AD groups maintained about the same stability in terms of preference judgments across
two weeks, even though the AD patients did not have explicit memory for the paintings. We conclude that aesthetic responses can be
preserved in the face of cognitive decline. This should encourage caregivers and family to engage in arts appreciation activities with
patients, and reinforces the validity of a preference response as a dependent measure in testing paradigms.
 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Alzheimer’s disease; Dementia; Memory disorder; Memory; Art; Visual perception; Aesthetic preference

1. Introduction
Participation and enjoyment of the arts is an important
part of many senior citizens’ lives. Patients with dementia
are often exposed informally to the arts in their daily lives,
and sometimes more formally in therapy (Gerdner, 2000;
Kahn-Dennis, 1997); however, little is known about the
eﬀect of dementia on musical and artistic abilities.
A few studies have focused on the eﬀects of dementia on
art production. These seem to show a decline in the artistic
abilities of patients with Alzheimer’s disease, for both
trained artists (Maurer & Prvulovic, 2004) and untrained
people (Seifert, Drennan, & Baker, 2001). In contrast, studies of patients with frontotemporal dementia (FTD) have
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demonstrated that artistic talents may emerge or be relatively preserved in a subset of patients with FTD (Miller,
Boone, Cummings, Read, & Mishkin, 2000; Miller et al.,
1998). These tend to be patients with the semantic form
of FTD, leading to the suggestion that in some cases, deterioration of brain areas involved in symbolic processing
might ‘‘release’’ artistic skills mediated largely by right
hemisphere structures.
Whereas art production is relatively rare in the general
and patient population, art consumption, in the form of
viewing art, is quite common. However, to our knowledge,
a systematic analysis of art appreciation has not been conducted with dementia patients. We believe that a study of
art appreciation can help us understand whether aesthetic
appraisal is as aﬀected by the disease as are cognitive abilities and also may inform caretakers about the probable
value of art exposure and therapy in dementia, speciﬁcally
early-stage Alzheimer’s disease (AD).
Our interest in aesthetic judgment emerged in the context of a previous study that we conducted on the ability
of AD patients to learn new music (Halpern & O’Connor,
2000). The implicit memory test in that study involved a
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pleasantness rating task for short unfamiliar melodies.
Higher pleasantness ratings for previously heard vs. new
melodies are taken to indicate implicit memory, which is
known as the mere exposure eﬀect (Zajonc, 1980). We
found that unimpaired seniors demonstrated enhanced
pleasantness ratings for old melodies, whereas AD patients
did not show this eﬀect.
We interpreted these ﬁndings as evidence of the AD
patients’ failure to encode new music, but the study raised
the question of the integrity of aesthetic judgment in
patients with AD. If AD impairs aesthetic judgment, then
pleasantness ratings might not be a reliable measurement
of any internal state, and thus a poor index of implicit
memory. More fundamentally, we wondered whether aesthetic judgment can remain intact in the context of ADrelated deterioration of language, memory, and other
abilities.
Leder, Belke, Oeberst, and Augustin (2004) have oﬀered
a model of aesthetic processing that may help focus this
research question. The ﬁrst stage of their model involves
perceptual analysis. Taking art as their primary example,
they consider aspects such as symmetry, color and grouping to be important in determining aesthetic experience.
The next stage involves implicit knowledge in the form of
familiarity with a work or a style. The third stage involves
explicit classiﬁcation of style or content, an ability that is
especially robust in people versed in the artistic domain;
personal taste may inﬂuence this stage as well. Taking these
three stages together results in a cycle of cognitive mastering and evaluation yielding an aesthetic judgment of the
quality of the work, based on cognitive mastery, and an
aesthetic emotion, a positive or negative reaction to the
artwork.
In the current study we studied preference rankings
for art in AD patients and non-AD controls. We
assumed the preference rankings would reﬂect a global
judgment of liking, which might encompass both the
quality and emotional judgment referred to by Leder
et al. (2004). The objects we studied were small-scale
color reproductions of unfamiliar paintings, in three different styles (described below). Because aesthetic preferences are personal judgments that cannot be quantiﬁed
and compared against absolute standards, we elected to
look at consistency of preferences over a two-week
period.
A number of studies with healthy individuals have suggested that people vary reliably in their individual preferences for visual patterns (Jacobsen, 2004; McManus,
1980) and that this preference remains stable over the short
time span investigated here (Höfel & Jacobsen, 2003). Our
materials diﬀered from these studies in being reproductions
of real artworks instead of formal graphic patterns, but if
anything, individual preferences could be even more important in this situation. Also, none of our participants were
highly trained in art, again setting up a situation in which
individual preference rather than any group diﬀerence
should drive the judgments.

The only study we located on aesthetic preference judgments in people suﬀering from dementia was reported by
Wijk, Berg, Sivik, and Steen (1999). As part of a larger
study on color naming and discrimination, they found that
patients were able to rank order a set of seven colors
according to preference. The average rank order of preference did not depend on severity of dementia, and patients’
ratings corresponded to ratings by normal control participants. Although judgment of monochromatic color chips
allows for only a limited aesthetic response, this study at
least suggests that asking AD patients to rank aesthetic
objects is a feasible paradigm.
We designed the task to avoid taxing well-known cognitive and perceptual deﬁcits in early to moderate AD, which
might mask the aesthetic response we were interested in.
First, we know that AD may be associated with some
visual perceptual problems. Particularly relevant to art
appreciation might be deﬁcits in color discrimination and
contrast sensitivity (Cronin-Golomb, 1995; CroninGolomb, Corkin, & Growdon, 1995). Failure to comprehend these basic dimensions might naturally lead to instability in the art appreciation preferences we wanted to
measure. On the other hand, we measured stability of art
judgment over a two-week interval. We thought that any
perceptual diﬃculties would not increase over two weeks
and thus should contribute only minimally to instability
in preference rankings. In addition we attempted to assess
and control for possible visual perceptual diﬃculties by
presenting a control task, in which pictures of everyday
objects that varied in real-world size were presented for
sorting on the size dimension. This task, while not a
detailed assessment of all perceptual diﬃculties, allowed
us in a global way to determine whether participants could
process depictions.
Nevertheless, global memory and naming diﬃculties in
AD patients could potentially aﬀect performance in our
task. We dealt with these factors in several ways. First,
our preference ordering task was simple and placed few
demands on naming, as no titles or names of artists were
presented and no verbal retrieval was required for the task.
Working memory limitations were not relevant because all
cards to be sorted were available for viewing until the participant was satisﬁed with the ranking. Episodic memory
was not required for the task (although it may have assisted
the task), as no reference at Session 2 was made to ranking
at Session 1. And the paintings were not familiar ones to
most untrained people, reducing the role of pre-experimental memory. Finally, we assessed recognition memory in
Experiment 2, in order to investigate whether the expected
worse performance of AD patients in explicit memory
would also be found in stability of preference rankings.
Even though we thought that the art preference task was
not heavily loaded on memory or naming skills, we nevertheless were interested in whether language or semantic
problems in AD (Giﬀard et al., 2002; Grossman et al.,
2003; Martin & Fedio, 1983) would aﬀect appreciation of
some types of art that might vary in the extent to which

A.R. Halpern et al. / Brain and Cognition 66 (2008) 65–72

they are easily verbalizable or for which a verbal code
might assist memory. Representational paintings contained
scenes that could be easily described and also could be distinguished from other paintings verbally, such as ‘‘ a vase
with ﬂowers’’; only one painting had that as a main ﬁgure.
Quasi-Representational art showed items occurring in unusual conﬁgurations or distortions, and thus would require
complex verbalization to describe, but that description
would help people discriminate one painting from another
in a memory test. Abstract paintings had simple geometrical forms and thus were easy to describe, but descriptions
of many such paintings in our set were similar (‘‘circles
and squares’’). We presented a variety of neuropsychological tasks to patients to see if performance might correlate
with naming or memory measures.
To summarize, in Experiment 1, we presented postcards
of artworks in three styles to patients and controls in two
sessions, two weeks apart. We examined the similarity of
preference ordering on those two occasions. In Experiment
2, we added a recognition task for the paintings at Session
2. We predicted that patients and controls would show
about the same stability of rank orderings across the two
weeks, despite cognitive deﬁcits in memory and language
among the patients. We took as a working assumption,
in agreement with literature cited above, that adults generally have stable individual preferences and dimensions by
which they judge art; we did not expect AD to aﬀect these
personal taste issues nor the ability of people with AD to
express them in the simple task we devised. We left open
the possibility that group diﬀerences might vary depending
on the type of art: Impaired verbal skills might, for
instance, particularly aﬀect judgments or memory of
Quasi-Representational art in the judgment task due to
the complex depiction-description mapping.
2. Experiment 1
2.1. Methods
2.1.1. Participants
Alzheimer’s Disease patients. Patients with probable AD
were referred by neurologists, psychiatrists and neuropsychologists in the Division of Behavioral Neurology at the
Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center (BIDMC), Harvard
Medical School. Patients were diagnosed according to the
NINCDS-ADRDA criteria for probable AD (McKhann
et al., 1984). All AD patients underwent an extensive evaluation in order to exclude other causes of dementia.
Patients with neuroimaging evidence of signiﬁcant ischemic
changes were not included in the study, nor were patients
who scored in the depressed range on the Geriatric Depression Scale (Brink et al., 1982). The ﬁnal sample of 16
patients scored between 12 and 27 on the Mini-Mental
State Exam (MMSE) (Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh,
1975) with a mean of 22.4.
Nondemented control participants. Nondemented control
participants (NCs) were recruited from a senior citizen
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center in the Hartford, CT area and a retirement community in the Boston area. Family members of the AD
patients, primarily spouses and siblings, were recruited during clinical visits to BIDMC. All NC participants scored
above 28 on the MMSE (maximum = 30). The ﬁnal sample
included 27 people. As shown in Table 1, participant
groups were matched according to age, years of education,
and self-rated interest in art.
Neuropsychological tests. Patients underwent comprehensive evaluation with a broad range of neuropsychological tests. A few patients were referred directly from
behavioral neurologists and their testing was more
restricted. We examined performance on the GDS, MMSE,
Dementia Rating Scale (DRS) and the DRS Memory subscale (Mattis, 1988) and the Boston Naming Testing (BNT,
Kaplan, Goodglass, & Weintraub, 1983). These tests were
administered to AD participants during the ﬁrst session.
NCs were administered the MMSE during the ﬁrst session.
Both groups were asked to indicate their interest in art on a
scale from 1 (No interest) to 10 (Very interested). Means
Table 1
Demographic characteristics and neuropsychological test scores
NC (Exp1)
Women

AD (Exp1)

NC (Exp 2)

AD (Exp 2)

19

9

11

13

Men

8

7

9

7

Age
M
SD

73.4
10.9

76.8
9.6

77.9
7.6

79.4
7.3

Education (years)
M
15.0
SD
2.5

15.4
4.2

13.6
2.7

14.7
3.0

MMSE
M
SD

22.4
3.9

28.3
1.3

22.0
4.5

29.2
.7

DRS Total
M
—
SD
—

119.5
9.3

—
—

119.5
15.6

DRS Memory
M
—
SD
—

14.9
4.1

—
—

15.2
5.4

BNT
M
SD

—
—

37.0
10.4

—
—

41.7
11.7

GDS
M
SD

—
—

3.4
2.9

Interest in Art
M
6.3
SD
2.3

5.6
2.3

7.3
3.9
—
—

8.8
6.2
—
—

Note. NC, Normal controls; AD, Alzheimer’s patients. MMSE, MiniMental State Examination; DRS, Dementia Rating Scale; BNT, Boston
Naming Test; GDS, Geriatric Depression Scale. In Experiment 2, data
were missing for some AD patients: N = 19 for DRS, N = 17 for BNT,
N = 18 for GDS. N = 15 for GDS in NC group. GDS was not administered to NC group in Experiment 1; Interest in Art was omitted from
Experiment 2.
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and standard deviations of test results are shown in Table
1.
2.1.2. Materials
Twenty-four 4.5 · 6.5 in colored art cards of paintings
were selected from The Art Box (1998) from three categories. One set showed Representational art. An example was
People in the Sun by Edward Hopper. This shows a group
of people seated in deck chairs on a patio, bathed in bright
sunlight, and facing a landscape. An example of our next
category, Quasi-Representational, was Weeping Woman
by Pablo Picasso: a recognizable portrait of a woman,
but painted in a Cubist style with distorted features and
unusual colors. The third category was completely nonrepresentational Abstract art. An example was Composition by
Piet Mondrian, depicting several quadrilaterals with black
borders, in white, red, blue, and yellow. A list of artists and
titles may be seen in Table 2. The control task used eight
4.5 · 6.5 in black and white digitized line drawings of
familiar objects (Snodgrass & Vanderwort, 1980).
2.1.3. Procedure
Participants were told that this was a study in art appreciation and it would involve sorting four sets of art cards.
All procedures were approved by the Institutional Review
Board at BIDMC. After obtaining informed consent (a
family member or caretaker serving as a witness for the
AD patients), participants were administered a set of
Table 2
Artists and paintings used as stimuli
Style

Artist

Painting

Representational
Alma–Tadema
Audubon
Chardin
Fantin–Latour
Gainsborough
Hammershoi
Hopper
Sargent

A Coin of Vantage
Roseate Spoonbill
The Young Schoolmistress
White and Pink Roses
Mr and Mrs Andrews
Interior with a Girl at the Clavier
People in the Sun
Paul Helleu Sketching with his Wife

Quasi-Representational
Basquiat
Bonnard
Dine
Dubuﬀet
Kitaj
Leger
Miro
Picasso

Untitled
The Open Window
My Name is Jim Dine
Jazz Band (Dirty Style Blues)
If Not, Not
The Builders
Women, Bird by Moonlight
Weeping Woman

Abstract
Baumeister
Diebenkorn
Heron
Hodgkin
Mondrian
Rodchenko
Turner
van Doesburg

Mortaruru with Red Overhead
Ocean Park No. 67
Fourteen Discs: July 20, 1963
Lovers
Composition
Composition (Overcoming Red)
Snowstorm: Steamboat oﬀ a Harbour’s Mouth
Arithmetic Composition

neuropsychological tests. Next they were shown the three
sets of art cards, one set at a time, and were asked to sort
the cards in the order from best to least liked based on their
individual preference. Two rows of four cards were displayed on a desk at which the participants were seated.
Participants were told this was an untimed task, that they
could change their mind at any time during the task until
they were satisﬁed with their choices, and that there were
no right or wrong answers. The Representational (Rep),
Abstract (Abs), and Quasi-Representational (Quasi) tasks
were presented in diﬀerent orders for diﬀerent people. All
possible orders were used across the experiment, although
not equally often. The ﬁnal task was always the control
task, which required the participants to look at eight cards
with line drawings of familiar objects (e.g., truck, key) and
order them in terms of their real-world size from largest to
smallest.
Two weeks later, all participants were asked to complete
the same tasks without any mention of trying to reproduce
preferences from the ﬁrst session. Tasks were presented in
the same order in Session 1 and Session 2 for a given
participant.
2.2. Results
2.2.1. Measurement of stability
Stability of preference (from Time 1 to Time 2) was calculated by ﬁrst determining the average change in rank per
item for each participant for each of the four tasks. That is,
the rank order at Time 1 was compared to the rank order
for the same item at Time 2. Diﬀerence Scores (Time 1–
Time 2 rank) were calculated for each item. Changes in
ranks were summed across the cards with an art style
and the total change score was divided by 8 to give a mean
rank change. If the two orders were identical, the change
score was 0. The smallest possible change was .25 (an interchange of 2 ranks averaged over 8 items) and the maximum
possible score was 4. Larger change scores indicated less
consistency from Time 1 to Time 2.
2.2.2. Control task
All participants in both groups, with two exceptions,
ordered the objects in the appropriate size order at both
sessions. Two individuals (one in each group) each interchanged the order of two items on one occasion. No further analyses were conducted on this task.
2.2.3. Preference task
Mean change scores for each group for each task are
shown in Table 3. Scores were in a narrow range of 1.29–
1.58, with four of the six outcomes nearly identical at
around 1.5. The absence of any group and art style diﬀerences was supported by a two-factor ANOVA, with the
between factor of group and within factor of task. Neither
main eﬀect was signiﬁcant [F(1, 41) = 1.09 for group and
F(2, 82) = .55 for task] and the critical interaction term of
group · task was near 0 [F(2, 82) = .34]; power to detect a
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medium-size diﬀerence, d = .50, with this average sample
size is approximately .80. For neither group did interest
in art correlate with mean rank change, all r’s = .23 to
+.21.
2.2.4. Neuropsychology tests
Because Experiments 1 and 2 were similar with respect
to the neuropsychological tests administered, we combined
the AD samples for a larger N, and report correlations for
the combined sample in a later section.
2.2.5. Item consistency
It is possible that consistent preference rankings could
be due to the fact that some paintings are universally preferred or disliked, as opposed to the individual diﬀerences
in preference we were hoping to capture. In order to
address this issue, we calculated the average ranking for
each painting in each condition at Time 1, separately for
AD and NC groups. We examined the standard deviation
of these rankings to get one idea of preference agreement
for the paintings. The mean standard deviations for the
two groups · three art styles were all approximately 2.0.
Given that the most preferred painting in the experiment
earned a mean rank of 2.21 and the least preferred earned
a rank of 6.61, the standard deviation is rather large and
indicates a fair amount of disagreement on the most and
least preferred painting.
We also examined how many paintings elicited an average ranking at the extreme of the scale. We deﬁned
‘‘extreme’’ as a mean ranking under 3.5 or over 5.5, which
are one rank below and above the median possible ranking
on a 1–8 scale (4.5), respectively. Mean rankings within the
extreme ranges indicate high agreement on most or least
preferred paintings. For ﬁve of the six groups of paintings
(two groups · three tasks), a maximum of two paintings
fell in the ‘‘extreme’’ range. The exception was the Quasi
task among the NC’s, where ﬁve of eight paintings had
mean ranks outside of this range. Considering all 24 paintings in the two groups, typically at least one person ranked
the painting as most or second most preferred, at the same
time that at least one person ranked it as least or second
least preferred. Only in four instances (out of 48) was this
not the case.
2.3. Discussion
First, we note that AD and NC participants performed
nearly ﬂawlessly on the control task of ordering pictured
objects according to real-world size. The success of the
AD participants allows us to eliminate the possibility that
they were unable to perform the task due to problems
understanding instructions or an inability to order items.
The AD patients’ normal performance on the control task
indicated that they have suﬃcient visual perceptual skills to
interpret pictures and associate them with real objects. This
result gives us the conﬁdence to interpret the results from
the tasks of interest.
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A second overall observation concerns the magnitude of
the change scores. We had no previous benchmarks by
which to predict how often anyone would change a preference judgment over a two-week period. The range of the
mean change score varied between 1.29 ranks changed
per item and 1.58 ranks. This strikes us as relatively stable
performance given a two-week period between sessions,
and no foreknowledge of the second task.
The most notable main result was the lack of group difference in change scores. AD patients and NC’s did not differ signiﬁcantly in their consistency of art preference over a
two-week interval of time. Thus despite impairments in
various areas of cognition, as indexed by the neuropsychological proﬁle presented in Table 1, the AD patients were as
able as their nondemented counterparts to react to the
paintings, order them according to personal preference,
and reproduce a similar ordering two weeks later. We interpret this ability as reﬂecting a stable core of art appreciation abilities, even for previously unfamiliar works.
We also found no interaction between style of art and
group. In light of investigations demonstrating that AD
may involve degradation of language functions and semantic memory (Giﬀard et al., 2002; Grossman et al., 2003;
Martin & Fedio, 1983), we predicted that the AD participants might show speciﬁc vulnerabilities for paintings that
were diﬃcult to describe (Quasi), but this did not turn out
to be the case.
A limitation of this study pertained to the possibility
that stability in art judgment across the two-week period
was enhanced by intact explicit memory. It is possible that
participants remembered their preferences for at least some
paintings two weeks later. On the face of it, the lower than
‘‘ceiling’’ performance among the NCs makes it unlikely
that they were merely retrieving a memorized order of card
preference over the two-week period. Also, remembering
three orders of eight items each over two weeks would seem
to be a very diﬃcult task for even unimpaired seniors, and
impossible for AD patients. However, to verify this possibility, Experiment 2 was a near-replication of Experiment
1, with an added explicit memory recognition test at the
beginning of Session 2. We predicted that the similarity
of art preference stability would persist in the face of poor
explicit memory among the patients. We also looked at
correlations of memory performance with stability of art
preference among the control participants to see if the
memory and preference judgments might depend on one
another.
3. Experiment 2
3.1. Methods
3.1.1. Participants
Patients were drawn from a pool similar to that in
Experiment 1. The ﬁnal sample of 20 patients scored
between 13 and 28 on the MMSE with a mean of 22.
The majority of the 20 NC participants were family
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members of the AD patients, primarily spouses and siblings, who were recruited during clinical visits to BIDMC.
Some NC’s were recruited from a retirement community in
the Boston area as well. All NC (N = 20) participants
scored above 28 on the MMSE, ranging between 26 and
30 on the MMSE, with a mean of 28.3.
3.1.2. Materials
Art materials were identical to those of Experiment 1 for
the preference study. For the recognition study, we chose
eight additional paintings in each style from the same
source, to serve as new items.
3.1.3. Procedure
Session 1 was identical to that of Experiment 1 except
that the Interest in Art question was omitted, and most
of the NC group received the GDS. Participants who
scored above 20 on the GDS were not included in the
study. In a few cases, not all neuropsychological tests could
be administered to an individual; the number of people
who took each test may be seen in the Note to Table 1.
In the memory task at Session 2, participants were shown
16 art postcards, half old and half new and asked to pick
out the eight cards seen two weeks previously. This was
done separately for each art style. We elected this constrained procedure because in our experience, some AD
patients who are aware of their memory problems are
reluctant to answer ‘‘old’’ to any items, introducing a
strong response bias. Because recognition was constrained
to choosing exactly eight cards, percent correct is based on
hits (percentage of old cards that were selected as old), as
false alarm rates are simply 1-hit rate.
3.2. Results
3.2.1. Control task
Seventeen control participants ordered the objects in the
appropriate size order at both sessions and three interchanged the order of two items. Among AD patients, nine
performed perfectly and an additional seven interchanged
two items. Although four patients had higher scores than
any NC participant, only one interchanged more than three
ranks. The average rank score change was only .34.
Because the average performance on the control task was
still quite good, even if slightly less so than in Experiment
1, we did not further analyze this measure.
3.2.2. Preference task
Mean change scores for each task are shown in Table 3.
Scores ranged from 1.28 to 1.94. An ANOVA, with the
between factor of group and within factor of task showed
no main eﬀect of group [F(1, 38) = .51], a main eﬀect of
art style [F(2, 76) = 5.08; p = .01], and no interaction
[F(2, 76) = .49]. Power to detect a medium size group diﬀerence, d = .50, was .78 in this experiment. Follow-up tests
using Tukey’s HSD showed that the Abs style was signiﬁcantly less stable than Quasi.

3.2.3. Memory task
The average number of hits for NC participants was 5.7
out of 8, or 72% (SD = 1.05) and for AD patients, 4.2, or
52% (SD = .91). An ANOVA tested for diﬀerences among
group and art style, and revealed a large main eﬀect of
group [F(1, 38) = 23.5, p < .001], but no eﬀect of art style
[F(2, 76) = 2.15, p = .12], or interaction [F(2, 76) = 1.10].
The 95% conﬁdence interval for the memory scores of the
AD group includes 50%, and thus we may consider that
group’s performance to be at chance.
3.2.4. Correlations
Correlations with memory. Among AD participants,
memory for a style was not correlated with change score.
Among NC participants, this was also true except, marginally, for the Abs style: Change score and memory correlated r(18) = .434, which is just slightly under r(crit) of
.44. To get a global view of the relationship between the
depression score and memory, we correlated the GDS with
mean memory score (averaged over the three styles); the
correlation was not signiﬁcant for either group (r = .27
for AD and .27 for NC).
Neuropsychology tests. We combined the AD samples
for the two studies, yielding N’s of 33–35, depending on
the test (see Table 4). DRS Memory, BNT, and GDS all
failed to predict change score, either considering styles separately or averaging over styles. The only signiﬁcant predictors were MMSE and DRS Total, which predicted
change score for the Quasi style, and the average of the
three styles.
3.2.5. Item consistency
As in Experiment 1, an item analysis looked at data
from Session 1. Once again, the mean standard deviations
for the two groups · three art styles were all about 2.0,
indicating a fairly large SD and thus disagreement. The
most preferred painting in the experiment earned a mean
rank of 2.45 and the least preferred earned a rank of 6.50.
For three of the six groups of paintings (two groups · three tasks), a maximum of two paintings fell in the
‘‘extreme’’ range. The other groups/tasks had three or four
Table 3
Mean change scores for each group in both experiments
Art Style

NC (Exp1)

AD (Exp1)

NC (Exp 2)

AD (Exp 2)

Representational
M
1.29
SD
.75

1.56
.64

1.62
.65

1.60
.61

Quasi-Representational
M
1.32
SD
.71

1.53
.73

1.28
.66

1.55
.83

Abstract
M
SD

1.58
.82

1.84
.96

1.94
.79

1.52
.76

Note: Change score can range from 0 (no change in order) to 4 (maximum
possible change). NC, Normal controls; AD, Alzheimer’s patients.
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Table 4
Correlations of neuropsychological tests with outcomes for patients over
both experiments
Measure
MMSE
DRS Total
DRS Memory
BNT
GDS

Rep

Quasi

.12
.16
.25
.09
.22

.42*
.41*
.19
.18
.00

Abs
.18
.18
.22
.20
.04

Mean 3 Styles
.36*
.36*
.30
.01
.10

Note: N’s vary slightly in each test, but are between 33 and 35.
*
p < .05.

paintings with ‘‘extreme’’ ratings. This indicates somewhat
more agreement on most and least liked paintings than in
Experiment 1. However, considering all 24 paintings in
the two groups, in only two instances (out of 48) did a
painting fail to elicit at least one ﬁrst- or second-place rank,
and at least one seventh- or eighth-place rank.
3.3. Discussion
The most striking outcome of Experiment 2 was that
similarity in art preference stability between the groups
was found at the same time the groups diverged greatly
in memory performance. In fact, the AD group on average
remembered none of the paintings, as assessed by explicit
recognition. This memory failure was expected in Alzheimer’s disease, where amnesia is a hallmark feature of the
disease. We also note that neuropsychological test scores
for the AD group revealed characteristic deﬁcits on tasks
of naming, and other cognitive skills. However, the tests
by and large did not predict the change scores, with the
exception of the MMSE and the DRS Total. These tests
are commonly viewed as global indices of dementia severity. They showed a modest correlation with change scores
for the styles combined, and the Quasi style by itself. The
correlations may be telling us that more severe dementia
levels may eventually aﬀect preference stability, but not
in the majority of mildly demented participants tested here
(26 of 35 patients scored 20 or higher on the MMSE).
Several comparisons with Experiment 1 are of interest.
Change scores were approximately the same overall in
the two studies, and in neither case did AD patients show
less (or more) stability than nondemented participants.
This stability in preference is likely not due to the artifact
of our paintings being universally preferred or nonpreferred. As in Experiment 1, even the Picasso Weeping
Woman, which on average elicited the highest nonpreferred
rank among controls, was the second most preferred painting of three of these participants. Rank-order correlations
show that the same paintings changed rank over the two
experiments (Spearman rhos ranging from .79 to .45 for
the two groups · three styles), again showing that preference for particular paintings varies among people both
within the same or diﬀerent experiments.
One diﬀerent outcome from Experiment 1 was that people showed signiﬁcantly more change in preference for the
Abstract style, compared at least to the Quasi style (Rep
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was intermediate). Although it is diﬃcult to see why this
might have changed between the studies, it is of note that
this diﬀerence from Experiment 1 was true for both groups,
again underscoring the similarity in preference performance. This outcome, along with the lack of predictive
power of language tests among the AD patients, suggests
that particular language or semantic disabilities are not
large factors in performance on these tasks for the patients.
Two factors may have contributed to the dissociation
between speciﬁc cognitive skills and stability of art preference. As noted in our Introduction, we tried to arrange the
testing situation to reduce dependence on working memory
and other cognitive skills in carrying out the task. Alternatively or in addition, computation of preference may not
depend heavily on explicit memory or language processes
for anyone, regardless of AD status. Some evidence for this
conclusion comes from the lack of a strong relationship
between explicit memory and change scores in the control
group. Ability to interpret artworks may be considered
more akin to a procedural than declarative skill, in that it
may develop over a lifetime of exposure without necessarily
depending on conscious analytical processes. We also know
that procedural learning is relatively more preserved in AD
than is declarative learning (Deweer et al., 1994), and in a
recent study, was found to be uncorrelated with plaque and
tangle density in brain tissue (Fleischman et al., 2005).
Taking a somewhat broader view, Leder et al. (2004)
model of aesthetic processing involves perceptual analysis
at an early stage and involves ‘‘cognitive mastery’’ at a later
stage. Our patients had at least grossly intact abilities to
interpret pictures, as shown by fairly good performance
on the control task. However, it would be interesting to test
dementia patients whose primary impairment is visuospatial, for instance those with Lewy body disease (Ferman
et al., 2004; Tiraboschi et al., 2006). The symptoms of this
illness also tend to ﬂuctuate over time, and thus we would
expect to see more instability in art preference among these
individuals. Conversely, patients with extensive art background would be interesting to follow longitudinally, as
they presumably would have more access than the average
person to mastery of art. This extra layer of mastery might
extend the period during which art preference remains
coherent, in the face of other deteriorating abilities.
One aspect of aesthetic judgment not yet discussed is
emotional response. It is likely that preference has both a
cognitive and emotional component (Leder et al., 2004).
Although we did not isolate emotional response in this
study, it is worth noting that the preponderance of evidence
suggests that processing of emotion is not foremost among
the vulnerabilities in early AD (Hamann, Monarch, &
Goldstein, 2002; Padovan, Versace, Thomas-Antérion, &
Laurent, 2002). Therefore, to the extent that emotional
processing contributes to preference judgments, we should
again not be surprised at the preservation of preferences
over our two-week interval.
Returning to some of the motivation for this study, we
conclude that patients with Alzheimer’s disease respond

72

A.R. Halpern et al. / Brain and Cognition 66 (2008) 65–72

to art, as indicated by preference, in as consistent fashion
as do unimpaired individuals. This should be encouraging
to art therapists and other caretakers, who may want to
oﬀer art appreciation experiences to AD patients. We also
showed that aesthetic response does not seem to be highly
dependent on explicit memory, as the AD patients’ preference responses were unimpaired even in the face of complete amnesia for the paintings presented two weeks
earlier. Thirdly, we provide evidence that preference ratings
are a valid measure to use with early-stage AD patients,
either directly or as indices of implicit memory.
Finally, we return to the item analysis to emphasize
that the preference responses by both groups seem to
be stable but individualistic responses. This ﬁnding supplements other studies showing the stability and individuality of preferences for sparser materials (Höfel &
Jacobsen, 2003; Jacobsen, 2004; McManus, 1980).
Although some compositional principles such as symmetry can account for preferences in formal patterns
(Cardenas and Harris, 2006; Jacobsen and Höfel,
2003), clearly, these individual preferences suggest aspects
other than formal properties contribute to preference
since our participants disagreed with one another quite
considerably in preference rankings. Therefore, in judging artworks, people with and without dementia really
do know what they like.
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